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Spagnoli: In Defense of the Compatibility of Freedom and Equality

IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
Filip Spagnoli
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the Author endeavors to find philosophical arguments
in favor of the link between freedom and equality and against the
traditional opposition between these values. The Author's thesis is
that the best way to defend this link is the adoption of a certain definition of freedom, namely freedom as autonomy, self-rule, and self-development. Other types of freedoms are more difficult to combine
with the demands of equality.
An important part of the link between freedom and equality will be
the law and the state. Protection by the law, security because of the
law, the creation of a public space by the law, and political participation in a democratic state based on the law are all factors which combine in producing an equal liberty for all, liberty in the sense of selfrule, freedom of choice, and the possibility to determine your own life
and to develop yourself.
II.

FREEDOM VS. EQUALITY

This concludes the discussion of the system of human rights and the
means to make rights real. One thing that has been presupposed and
taken for granted until now is the importance of human rights. The
Author already mentioned that it is not the Author's intention to deal
with this topic within the limits of this volume, but it seems unfair to
avoid the question altogether. Why are human rights so important
that we need to know how to make them real? Why do we need to
understand them? The Author's lapidary answer until now has been
that human rights protect a number of universally important values
such as peace, prosperity, freedom, equality, diversity, identity, and
belonging. What the Author failed to say is how they can do that.
The Author thinks that one can agree that an in-depth answer to such
a question merits a separate discussion. Indeed, the Author can point
to another publication dealing only with this question.' What the Author can offer in the space of this book is just one example. In this
chapter, the Author will try to show how human rights can protect
freedom and equality, two values which the Author thinks are universally important and cherished. This will give the reader an idea of the
importance of human rights.
Over the last centuries, it has become kind of a tradition to juxtapose freedom and equality and to view these two important human
1. See infra, note 2.
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values as almost tragically opposing goals, one inevitably leading to
the limitation of the other. For example, one can point to the way in
which the claims of equality, as they are expressed in economic rights
and income redistribution, limit the freedom of the wealthier parts of
the population. Moreover, the struggle against poverty has often become the overriding preoccupation and even an excuse for violations
of freedom rights. Non-economic injustices are often readily accepted
once people are convinced that these injustices are needed to combat
economic injustices. Another example of the way in which the struggle for equality limits the freedom of certain groups is given by some
kinds of affirmative-action programs. And finally, the principle of
non-discrimination may require limiting the freedom of expression of
those who promote racism or other forms of discrimination.
Conversely, freedom can also limit equality. The unfettered free
market tends to produce economic inequalities. When the unequal
distribution of talent and starting capital is not checked by government intervention then the outcome tends to be more economic inequality. In most cases, economic equality as prescribed by economic
rights is not the automatic product of voluntary caritas or free solidarity. There is no Invisible Hand. Freedom alone does not guarantee
economic equality. It often even diminishes it. Some government intervention and coercion is necessary in order to redistribute wealth.
An absolute protection of property-a freedom right-threatens economic equality. If absolute freedom of expression includes the protection of hatred and racist speech, inequality, discrimination, and even
genocide may result.
III.

UNLIMITED AND LIMITED NEGATIVE FREEDOM

Contradictions between cherished goals always have something
tragic. Much of our great literature since the Greek tragedies deals
with such contradictions (love and loyalty, duty and love, family and
loyalty, love and faith, etc.). My thesis is that the contradiction between freedom and equality is caused by a certain way of understanding freedom, and the only way out of our tragedy is the adoption of a
more complex and complete definition of freedom.
The definition to which object to has been most clearly stated by
Thomas Hobbes in the following excerpt of his Leviathan: "By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of external Impediments: which Impediments, may
oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would."2
The definition of freedom as the ability to do what you want has
become the common sense understanding of the word. It is a negative
definition because it focuses on the absence of impediments, con2. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press,
770
rev. student ed. 1996) (1651).
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straints, or limits on actions (limits imposed by other human beings,
by the state, by nature, or perhaps even by our own passions). It is
obvious that an absolute version of this kind of freedom is possible
only outside of the state and the law.
However, is it possible at all? And if so, is it acceptable? For some
of us it may be possible. It is not possible for the many victims who
are the inevitable result of this kind of freedom. If everybody can do
as he or she likes, then we create offenders and victims and only the
offenders are free. Victims obviously cannot do as they like. And we
can all become victims. Not even the strongest among us can do as he
likes, because he has to sleep now and again and we are weak when
we sleep. Unlimited and lawless freedom as in the definition of Hobbes cannot and should not exist. It is self-destructive and immoral-as
Hobbes himself clearly understood.
Only anarchists still believe in this kind of freedom, which is license
rather than liberty. Libertarians, proponents of the minimal state,
free marketers, and liberals in the European sense of the word adopt a
limited version of the Hobbesian freedom. They rightly worry about
the victims, and they agree to have laws which limit freedom for the
sake of security and hence for the sake of the freedom of others. No
freedom without security. Hence they try to equalize freedom.
Freedom for them is always freedom in the state and freedom
within the limits of the rule of law. In a situation of lawlessness, I can
only do as I like if I am the strongest of all. Without laws, there is no
freedom for all. If I accept the law, then I will gain security, survival,
and limited freedom. If I do not accept the law, then I will only create
the freedom of the fox in the chicken-house, and I will probably not
be the fox.
According to this school of thought, all coercion is bad, but some
kind of coercion is necessary. If people were always friendly to each
other, the state would not-be necessary, and people would not have to
accept a limitation of their freedom. State coercion in the form of
laws limits freedom because it forces people to act in a way that is
contrary to their wishes. In this worldview, it is accepted that coercion
can actually promote freedom. Coercing one person, and thus limiting his or her freedom, can promote the freedom of other persons,
namely the freedom of the "chickens."
However, because of the importance of freedom as the ability to do
as you like, the proponents of limited negative freedom want to keep
the area of the law and the state as small as possible. Liberalism, if we
may use this term as a label for these people,3 believes that the only
way in which the state can promote freedom is by guaranteeing the
security of the weak. The state should only protect the weak against
3. Libertarians seems too narrow a term given the marginality of this school of
thought compared to the widely held view on freedom which I try to describe here.771
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the strong. In this way, it makes it possible for the weak to do as they
want. It puts the freedom of the weak on the same level as the freedom of the strong who can do what they want even without
protection.
For the rest, the state should not do anything and should keep itself
as inconspicuous as possible. It should create an area which is free
from state coercion and in which people can do as they like. In a
certain sense, this freedom is a stateless freedom even though the
state must act to protect it. The area of non-interference must be as
large as possible in order to allow freedom to become as comprehensive as possible. Freedom and politics can only go together insofar as
politics guarantees freedom from politics.4
Contrary to anarchists, liberals believe-correctly I think-that the
area of freedom or noninterference cannot be unlimited because this
would result in insecurity, chaos, and war. But in a sense both anarchism and liberalism believe in unlimited freedom. For the former it is
an ideal for the future, for the latter it is something which belongs to a
perhaps mythical past (the time of the "contract") and which can only
be desirable in the unlikely event that human beings learn to behave
and to respect each others' security.
Liberalism thus creates a separation between the unfree area of the
state and the law on the one hand, and the free area of the rest of life
on the other hand. I will object to this separation and will claim that
the state can be an area of freedom and that involvement in the state
can promote freedom.
IV.

EQUAL FREEDOM

Is the problem of freedom and equality solved by liberalism? Law
and the security that it produces indeed equalize freedom. But are
our values really harmonized, and is the tragedy resolved? Not quite.
The Author can see at least three problems remaining. The first one is
poverty. Poor people cannot do what they want, and the laws which
protect their physical security against the free actions of others will
not help them. Their situation is not primarily caused by the limitations imposed on them by the actions of others. And the provision of
social security is much more controversial than the provision of physical security, which is bizarre given that both kinds of security have the
same purpose, namely the equalization of freedom in the sense of the
ability to do as you want. We see here that the state, by intervening
and reducing poverty, can promote freedom.
A second problem with the limited Hobbesian freedom is revealed
by the bigot. Take the example of the bigot who is not poor but does
not want anything else in life than watching sport, drinking beer, and
shouting at his wife. He can do as he wants, but is he free? Here we
4.

HANNAH

ARENDT, TUSSEN VERLEDEN EN TOEKOMST
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see that it may be necessary to redefine freedom and not only to limit
it. Freedom means not only the ability to do what you choose, but
also, and in the first place, the fact of having significant choices, the
ability to expand the options you can choose from, the ability to make
an educated choice between examined options and to choose the options which are best for yourself and for the people around you. In
other words, freedom is the ability to choose the options which make
ourselves better persons and allow us and our fellow-humans to selfdevelop.
Now, how do you widen the available choices and check if what you
want is really what you want? Only if all possible options and choices
are flooded with the light of publicity and education. When you see
which options are available, when you hear people discussing the merits of different options and objects of volition, only then can you make
an educated choice. This publicity, and hence freedom as the possibility to develop yourself, requires a legal system. Legally protected
human rights for example open up the world of culture, art, science,
history, education, etc. They open up the options, show the merits of
all options, and hence can improve your volition. Constraining rules
are also enabling rules. By limiting certain kinds of behavior they
make other behavior possible, for example, public discussion of objects of volition. Only in a public space protected by legal rights,
where everybody is equal and where everybody can speak and listen
in an equal way, can we examine our opinions and options and can we
self-develop.
The law is necessary because if there is no external control, then
rights will be violated, security rights but also rights which protect the
public space in which choices can appear. Some people will be victims
of others and will not be free, not in any sense of the word. They
cannot do as they like and they have no public life. And we can all be
victims in certain circumstances. Laws and obedience are not just obstacles or impediments, limits on our freedom or elements of oppression. They are prerequisites for public life and therefore prerequisites
for freedom as well because freedom needs public life.
Laws do not only limit the actions of people; they also link the actions of people because they create a public life. And these links
make freedom possible. Laws are rules for public life and should not
disappear. The state is a mechanism to coerce people, but this is not
necessarily negative. On the contrary, coercion creates possibilities.
The state creates, by way of coercion, the prerequisites for public
life-such as security and human rights-and therefore creates the
possibility of freedom.
A third problem with the limited freedom to do as you want is that
this concept disregards a longstanding tradition that views freedom as
autonomy. Individual autonomy, or the sense of having some measure of control over your own life, is something different from the77 3
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limited or unlimited individual freedom to do as you like. It is a more
communal and less individualistic notion since it requires political selfgovernment through democratic participation.
Like freedom in the sense of self-development, and unlike freedom
as the (limited) ability to do as you like, autonomy is not separated
from the state; it is not a freedom outside of the state. It is necessarily
a part of the state and cannot survive without it. People usually engage in self-government within state institutions, local or national. By
determining the laws and rules which govern their lives, they govern
themselves. In a democracy, the coercion of the law is the coercion of
people over themselves. If people make their own laws, then obeying
the law means obeying yourself and having control over your life.
In this respect, autonomy can be said to resemble freedom as the
ability to do as you like, because people who obey themselves do as
they like. They decide for themselves and they are autonomous. They
do not obey an external force and they are free from external rules
and external coercion. All this is also demanded by the Hobbesian
definition. The difference with the Hobbesian definition is that autonomy does not result from the isolated exercise of an individual will
outside of state control. In autonomy, the ability to do as you like is
mediated through political participation and legislation. This is comparable to the way in which this ability is mediated through public life
in the notion of freedom as self-development (you can only do as you
like when you know about the options and when the options appear in
public).
Central to autonomy is the law. The law is an extension and expression of the people and of their convictions. Obeying a law is then
merely a matter of internal coherence, of being in agreement with
your own convictions and internal laws regarding the actions that can
or cannot be done. People obey the law because they can recognize
their convictions in the law and they can recognize their convictions
because they make the law themselves. In a democracy, the people
find the laws in themselves and agree with the laws which they obey.
A law that forbids me to do what my conviction also forbids me to do,
does not limit my freedom.
However, the law in a democracy is not merely a simple expression
of the will and the internal law of the people. People do not just recognize their prior convictions in the laws. The law, or better the common act of legislation, helps to form these convictions. Political
participation shapes the will of the people. It is a more educated will
than the will of an isolated individual because the political deliberations that precede the act of legislation have an educational effect.
People get informed about alternatives, pros and cons, etc. So autonomy is similar to freedom as the ability to do as you want, but in a
sense it is a better version of it because the quality of human volition
is improved by it, just as it is improved by publicity. Freedom as seV74
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development improves volition by offering a public space in which to
examine the objects of our will and to widen the options. Freedom as
autonomy improves volition by allowing people to act together and
establish laws.
If we temporarily put aside the problem of the democratic minority,
then we see that autonomy is a very equal kind of freedom. There is
an equal right to political participation, an equal identification with
the law, the equal examination of options and pros and cons, etc.
Is self-control an individual ability or one which is exercised together with others? It is clear, I think, that a community which governs itself gives more self-control to its members than individuals who
try to achieve this self-control independently. Cooperation makes it
easier to solve certain problems. If self-control means determining
your own life, then it also means being able to decide something and
to solve problems. Autonomy is therefore best served by democratic
political participation and cooperation.
If we look at freedom in this way, we can say that a tyrant is not
more free than his subjects. Perhaps he is more free because he has a
greater ability to do as he likes. But a tyrant does not have access to a
political and public space which is indispensable for freedom in the
sense of autonomy or self-development. Such a space needs the protection of democracy and human rights and the equal participation of
all, and is therefore incompatible with tyranny:
The point of Herodotus' equation of freedom with no-rule was that
the ruler himself was not free; by assuming the rule over others, he
had deprived himself of those peers in whose company he could
have been free. In other words, he had destroyed the political space
itself, with the result that there was no freedom extant any longer,
either for himself or for those over whom he ruled.5
The problem can also be framed in terms of the good life. Is our good
life something individual and outside of politics and the public space,
or is it something more communal? Does it mean that our private
space has to be protected against others or does it also need others,
their points of view, their criticism, and their cooperation in shaping
our lives? I think the latter is the case because without the public
space in which others can appear and without the political space in
which we can cooperate with others, our volition is of inferior quality.
We may be able to do what we want, but what we want is not what
would be best for us.
But what about the democratic minorities? Do they have equal
freedom, equal autonomy? Of course, in a democracy there is always
a minimum of external control. Only the majority exercises voluntary
self-legislation, self-control, and self-obedience because only the majority accepts and desires the law voluntarily. The minority, or even
5.

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION
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individuals belonging to the majority, can decide to disagree with the
law because they do not identify with it or because they have a moment of weakness which disables the internal law.
The minorities' disagreement with the law does not necessarily
force them to break the law; they can decide to respect the law because they do not wish to be punished, because they like order and
predictability, or because they have an attitude of respect towards the
law in general. But even if they do not break the law, this law is
forced upon them by themselves. They do not have self-control or
autonomy. There is indirect external control and coercion, and hence
not even freedom in Hobbes' definition. They don't obey themselves
and cannot do as they like. The law does not come from the inside. It
is not a part of the people in question even if they respect or accept it
voluntarily for the reasons given above.
However, we can point to the fact that in a well functioning democracy everyone is now and again in the minority, which means that
there is more or less equal autonomy across the population and over a
longer period of time, and hence equal freedom. And secondly, although the minorities do not accept all majority laws, they are likely
to accept the fundamental laws such as human rights that open the
public space for majority and minority alike, and that therefore offer
the minority freedom as self-development, even while taking away,
temporarily, freedom as autonomy.
The laws that exist-and that the Author, as a member of the minority, does not accept-limits the Author's freedom in a certain
sense. They limit the things the Author can do and the ways in which
the Author can act, they limit the Author's self-control, but they do it
in such a way that a public space comes into existence in which the
Author's freedom can unfold, freedom as self-development. 6
V.

FREEDOM AND THE STATE

Freedom in every sense of the word-including the freedom to do
as you like, at least if we want this to be an equal kind of freedomneeds the state and the rule of law. So entering into a state-metaphorically of course-is not the limitation of freedom but the start of
it. For the proponents of the limited version of Hobbes' negative freedom, the state cannot create freedom. It only equalizes it by taking
away some of it. The state always limits freedom because it is no more
than a mechanism for coercion and security and hence takes away
some of our power to do as we like, justifiably but also regrettably.
This reasoning implies some sort of natural or pre-political freedom
which exists before and outside of the state, and which is partly surrendered in exchange for security by the theoretical or historical entry
into the state-system (the so-called "contract"). But this natural free6. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 81.
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dom is a highly contestable concept, and not only because it is very
unlikely that man lived in a situation of natural and unlimited freedom
in those prehistorical times in which states or laws did not exist. At
best, this natural freedom was or is highly unequal and other kinds of
freedom were entirely impossible because there was no self-governand
ment and no public life, or at least no stable, equally accessible,
7
predictable public life protected by the state and the law.
It is equally unlikely that the disappearance of the state will result
in more freedom. A war of all against all is much more likely. The
"chickens" among us need protection, and protection is best provided
by an impartial third party in order to avoid the spiral of revenge
caused by self-defense. This third party is almost always, and perhaps
inevitably, the state. But even the limitation (rather than the disappearance) of the state to what is strictly required by the provision of
protection, security, and peace, will not result in more freedom. Social security, political participation, and the protection of the public
space are also requirements of freedom. A limited state may not be
able to provide these institutions and may therefore harm freedom.
Freedom is created on the basis of and after the law. The entry into a
state is the foundation and the beginning of freedom instead of the
surrender of freedom. "The state is the actuality of concrete freedom.... Society 8and state ... are the only situations in which freedom
can be realised.",
Only a state can create self-government and a public space in which
autonomy and self-development can become possible. Freedom is situated in the state and in politics. Instead of a necessary evil-necessary because of human nature and evil because of the limitations on
freedom-we can see the state as something positive and the creator
of freedom.
So paradoxically, freedom can only exist together with obedience
because only a state with its rules and laws can make freedom possible, both a simplistic negative freedom that is limited and hence
equalized for all, and a freedom that is more than the simple ability to
do as you like. Obedience to rules opens up the public and political
space in which people can develop and can take control over their
lives. Freedom is, therefore, not incompatible with power and
coercion.
The state not only restricts freedom, its elimination or limitation
will not give us freedom, not even at the basic level of the ability to do
as we like, at least if we want this ability to be equally distributed. A
state limited to the provision of security will not provide this equality.
Economic intervention by the state is also necessary. An equally lim7. If there is no natural freedom, there may be natural rights. Rights and freedoms are not necessarily the same thing, even though the word "liberties" is often
used as a synonym for the word "rights".
8. Ross HARRISON, DEMOCRACY 114 (1996).
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ited freedom, autonomy, and self-development may not be safe in the
hands of anarchists, libertarians, free marketers, or proponents of the
minimal state. All these kinds of freedom require more than constant
attacks on the state. They require active involvement of the state, either to equalize freedom or to create its preconditions and institutions. In particular, social security, political rights, and civil rights are
tools for this involvement, but only the latter are acceptable for the
proponents of the minimal state.
Freedom in every sense of the word needs all types of human rights,
economic, civil, and political. The minimal state ideology only accepts
state interventions for security when physical security is threatened by
the freedom of others or by state violations of freedom rights. The
goal is to force the state to limit its own interference and to force it to
limit the harmful use of freedom by other citizen. It is politically controversial that the state should actively interfere to build a public
space and a political system of self-government, to equalize the access
to this space and system, particularly economically, and to equalize
the ability to do as you want beyond the equalization offered by security. Economic rights and affirmative action do not always enjoy majority support. But if coercion is justified for the sake of security, then
why not for social security and anti-discrimination?
[W]hy is avoiding coercion a supreme end that dominates all other
ends? What makes noncoercion superior to justice, equality, freedom, security, happiness, and other values? If any of these ends are
superior to noncoercion, then would not coercion be justified if it
were the sole means in some situations for achieving the superior
value? Alternatively, if one believes that the world of values is not
dominated by a single absolute end but is ... a pluralistic universe,
judgments about trade-offs between coercion
then one must make
9
and other values.
From the libertarian point of view, the state cannot promote freedom. It always harms freedom because it is no more than a mechanism of coercion necessary to oppress evil originating from the state
or from the free actions of our fellow citizens, and coercion always
takes away the power to do as you like. Libertarians accept that some
freedom is taken away by the state; they accept that freedom and security need to be balanced against each other and that freedom needs
to be equalized and protected against the freedom of others. However, freedom is most important, and state coercion for security and
equality should therefore be kept to a minimum. Other values, such
as autonomy, self-government, self-development, and economic
equality, which depend on state intervention and coercion, tend to get
less attention in this worldview, even if they can be seen as prerequisites for freedom in a more profound sense of the word, in a sense that
9.

ROBERT

A.

DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS

1989).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/23
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.22

CRITICS 45-46 (Yale Univ. Press
-7-

10

Spagnoli: In Defense of the Compatibility of Freedom and Equality

2007] COMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

779

is different from the sum of the unhindered activities outside of the
state and the law.
So the question is what kind and what degree of coercion we are
ready to accept as a trade-off for our other values? If the freedom to
do as you like is the only or the supreme value, then it seems that only
coercion for security is acceptable. If you agree that not only insecurity and the freedom of others but also economic inequality can destroy the ability to do as you like, you may be willing to accept some
kind of state coercion for the protection of economic security. And if
you value autonomy, self-government, and self-development, you may
also accept state coercion for the creation of an equally accessible
public and political space.
Freedom on the one hand, and coercion, law, power, politics, and
the state on the other hand, are not incompatible, and one is not defined by the absence of the other. Freedom does not begin where
politics, the state, and coercion stop. Pushing back politics, the state,
and coercion can diminish freedom instead of increasing it. Freedom
from politics may result in the end of freedom. Freedom is not the art
of anti-politics. However, freedom and power are not just compatible.
Freedom in the sense of autonomy is a kind of power, namely power
over your own life.
Of course, it is obvious that not every kind of coercion by the state
or the law is beneficial. A state which coerces in order to steal from
the people or oppress them, for example, can never promote freedom.
Only a state that respects the longstanding principles of the rule of
law, including human rights, can protect freedom because only such a
state can promote security, self-government, autonomy, public life,
etc.
Freedom does not follow automatically from the coercion of the
law. The law must be the right kind of law:
* it must protect human rights, in particular the security rights of
possible victims but also the rights of the poor;
* it must protect the public space as a necessary condition for freedom in the sense of self-development, and it can do so because it
protects human rights;
" and it must be the product of the people if it is to promote
autonomy.
The desire to keep state interference restricted is entirely justified.
The number of limits on actions should indeed be as small as possible.
The power of the state cannot be absolute or unlimited-we need a
civil society, a free space beyond the reach of the limited state-but
the minimum number of limits on actions is much larger than the
number of limits necessary for security. Security is not the only value.
Poverty as well can impair freedom, even at the basic level of the ability to do as you like. Hence, laws which eliminate poverty and redistribute wealth (as is demanded by economic rights) can also be
779
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acceptable limits on actions. Moreover, reducing the state to something very small and eliminating politics from society as much as we
can, can harm political life and freedom in the sense of autonomy, at
least as long as we continue to deny the distinction between politics
and the state.
It is obvious that the extra-political sphere should not be considered
as the only stronghold of freedom. Limiting politics, the state, and
coercion should not be our only worry. We should also try to make
politics compatible with self-government, autonomy, and self-development and we should try to see state coercion as something which is
necessary for our freedom.
Coercion, if it is to promote equal freedom in different senses of the
word, has to be:
1. Self-coercion when possible because of autonomy and self-control, and if not:
2. Limited coercion, limited in the sense of:
* Compatible with human rights, especially the rights of the
minority because the minority, while lacking autonomy, can
use human rights for freedom in the sense of selfdevelopment.
* Limited to what is necessary for equal freedom, security,
and public and political life.
* Legal coercion because otherwise it will not be limited. (A
law is limited by definition. Coercion by persons is much
more arbitrary and unlimited than coercion by the law because the meaning of personal commands is not as well defined or as stable as the meaning of laws. Personal
commands can be anything, whereas a law is what it is, it is
written down, in a very specific manner, and it remains the
same, otherwise there would be no reason to write it down.
A tyrant also coerces, but he coerces in an unlimited way. In
general, he does not use laws, or if he does, he uses them in
an improper way. The meaning of his laws is unlimited, unpredictable, and changing. Moreover, his laws violate
human rights and are aimed at particular groups in society
and are not general or neutral as they are supposed to be.)
3. Equal coercion (legal coercion is by definition equal coercion;
the law rules over and coerces everybody in the same way).
Much of political philosophy is an attempt to answer the following
question: how do we promote freedom without stumbling into anarchy, and how do we use power without stumbling into tyranny? If we
believe that freedom gravitates towards anarchy, then we assume that
freedom is no more than the ability to do as we like and that we
should abolish all rules or as many rules as possible in order to protect
freedom. Then we quickly discover the problem of anarchy, and not
to mention the problem of the inequality which this kind of freedom
produces. If insecurity, chaos, and war are a threat to the freedom o 80
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some (to the freedom of the weak who can no longer do as they like),
then they are also the ultimate expression of the freedom of others.
Insecurity and anarchy are the consequences of our ability to do as we
like and hence the consequence of our freedom.
However, if we redefine freedom as autonomy and self-development, or even as the equal ability to do as you like, then we see that
freedom needs rules and hence the danger of anarchy is averted. If
power and coercion gravitate towards tyranny, then we assume that
they are evil-maybe necessary but certainly evil-and that we should
try to contain them as much as the development of human nature permits. However, if we accept that power and coercion not only constrain but also enable, that they create a public and political space
which can be used for the development of freedom, then we start to
see the state in a more positive light, and we can put aside the fear of
tyranny.
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